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ABSTRAK
Studi ini membahas tentang pemicu konflik dalam pembangunan Bandara Internasional Yogyakarta (YIA) di Temon, Kulon Progo, dengan menggunakan kerangka politik
ekonomi. Penelitian ini menggunakan teori dominasi elit berbasis lahan atas mesin pertumbuhan perkotaan dan teori-teori yang menjelaskan pemicu konflik yang disebabkan
oleh pembangunan dan pembangunan infrastruktur. Temuan studi ini menunjukkan
bahwa konflik tersebut didorong oleh ketidaksepakatan mengenai sumber daya lahan
yang muncul dari ambisi pemerintah untuk merespon tekanan untuk mengubah lahan
pedesaan di wilayah tersebut menjadi kawasan perkotaan dengan konsep aerotropolis dan MICE. Desakan tersebut datang dari kepentingan kelompok elite lokal dan
nasional, yang melengkapi masalah dominasi kepemilikan tanah yang masih ada oleh
elit politik lokal Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta. Dengan demikian, konflik tidak hanya
terkait dengan pembangunan infrastruktur tetapi juga konflik lahan yang muncul dari
kebijakan pembangunan perkotaan. Pemicu konflik lainnya termasuk tata kelola proyek
yang buruk dan faktor-faktor sosial lain.
Kata kunci : konflik agraria, infrastruktur, ekonomi politik, politik perkotaan, dominasi
elite.
ABSTRACT
The study discusses the drivers of conflict in the construction of Yogyakarta International Airport (YIA) in Temon, Kulon Progo, using a politico-economic framework. This
research employs the theory of land-based elite domination of urban growth machines
and theories that explain the drivers of conflicts caused by construction and development of infrastructure. The findings of this study show that the conflict was driven
by disagreements on land resource that emerged from the government’s ambition to
respond to the pressure to transform the rural lands in the region into an urban area
under the concepts of aerotropolis and MICE. The pressure came from the interests of
local and national elite groups, which complemented the extant problem of domination
of land ownership by the local political elites of Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta. Thus,
the conflict was related to not only the development of infrastructure but also a land
conflict that arose from urban development policies. The other drivers of the conflict
include poor governance of the project and social factors.
Keywords: agrarian conflict, infrastructure, political economy, urban politics, elite
domination.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7454/jp.v6i1.214
* The author is a junior researcher at IDESSS.
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I N T RODUC T ION

Discourse on the tourism industry is relatively new to the field of research on land and natural resource conflicts in the past decade. There
are several reasons for this lack of discussion on this subject: (1) the fragmentation of the tourism industry and the many stakeholders involved;
(2) the industry’s association with leisure and tertiary needs, resulting
in issues or cases of eviction being ignored; and (3) the concentration
of advocacy groups’ focus on the violation of land rights by extractive
industries—such as mining and agroindustry—because of the large
scope of land right violations. However, access to land is a necessary
prerequisite for the growth of tourism, supported by the provision of
public facilities and infrastructure.
Land conflicts in the face of the growth of the tourism industry
can be attributed to various factors, such as the rights of the people
impacted, management of the tourism industry or business, and the
environmental, economic, and social risks that the project or its development poses (Boudet, Jayasurendra, and Davis 2011; Ghimire 2012).
Conflicts may also ensue because of information discrepancy (Park et
al. 2017). At certain stages of intensity, conflicts may also be triggered
by the failure to tend to the demands of the people or parties involved;
by difference in perceptions during consultation and compensation;
by problems in administrative procedure; and by the lack of government efforts to resolve the conflicts (Lam and Woo 2009). The analysis
of political economy in studies on conflicts pertaining to infrastructure development cannot be ignored, such as an explanation on elite
domination of infrastructure policies (Musgrave and Wong 2016). The
exploitation of natural resources for the development of infrastructure
that only benefits the elites may also be a cause for conflict (Mashatt,
Long, and Crum 2008).
Conflicts caused by elite domination may happen due to the scarcity
and monopoly of resources by the state, private companies, or social
elites through the acquisition/seizure of resources (Robbins 2012). This
elite domination is in accordance with what is called elite capture, that
is, the effort or measures taken by those in possession of power and
https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/politik/vol6/iss1/4
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wealth to reap benefits from new opportunities and accumulate wealth
and power (Colfer and Capistrano 2006). The present research aims
to show that drivers of infrastructure development-related conflicts are
not limited to problems in management or governance and the social and economic effects of the projects but also extend to the elites’
domination, which results in policies that mainly cater to their interests.
These conflict drivers are reflected in the case of the construction of
the New Yogyakarta International Airport (NYIA) in Temon District,
Kulon Progo Regency, Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta/Special Region of
Yogyakarta (DIY).
Construction and investment in infrastructure are integral to the
process of transitional urban development. In other words, investment
and development of infrastructure are prerequisites for the growth of urban areas (Ingram and Kessides 1994). The author’s findings show that
conflicts pertaining to urban development are caused by land conflicts
that emerge as a result the government’s ambition to respond to the
pressure to develop rural areas into urban areas, using the concept of
aerotropolis. Land conflicts tend to intensify when faced with the rapid
growth of urban areas in peri-urban zones, which is indicated by the
transition of areal use from rural to urban use (Lombard 2016). These
pressures are result of the interests of the national and local elites, as
well as the domination of land ownership by local political elites in DIY.
Furthermore, vertical conflicts between the residents impacted by
the construction and the political-economic elites involved in the development of the NYIA megaproject are often linked to risks of ecologic
degradation, which were discussed in academic studies by NGOs and
intellectual as well as environmental groups. Similar to other recent
and complex agrarian conflicts in Indonesia, these conflicts happen
due to the absence of efforts to resolve them, issues and threats related
to environmental destruction, and the concentration of land ownership
among a number of elites (Rachman 2015). The emergence of agrarian
conflicts cannot be separated from the government’s economic ambition to bolster infrastructure development. The Joko Widodo administration planned to achieve this target through three key steps: ease in
Published by UI Scholars Hub, 2020
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the granting of licenses, provision of land, and funding through loans
(Wahid et al. 2017). These steps show how the development of physical infrastructure emphasizes goals, while it marginalizes the people’s
interests and participation. Therefore, the research question that the
author aims to answer in this study is, what are the drivers of the conflict
in the case of the NYIA megaproject construction in Temon District,
Kulon Progo Regency in 2012–18?
L I T ER AT U R E R E V I E W

Land-based elite domination in urban
growth machine theor y
This theory is derived from the theory of the urban as a growth machine, which is essentially developed based on elite theory. The theory’s
main thesis is that the orientation of urban or local development policies tends to revolve around elite interests through the intensification
of land use. Through a neo-marxist approach, this theory was then developed by Molotch (1976), who regard the urban area as a competition
arena in the field of land development. This premise is based on the
logic of the modern state, where land is regarded as the most valuable
commodity to obtain economic benefits.
In the shaping of the urban system, Harding (1995) states that there
is an exclusive correlation between two types of power, parochial capital
and metropolitan capital. Parochial capital possesses assets in the form
of land and other immovable property, while metropolitan capital holds
assets in the form of money or investment. These two types of power coalesce to productively develop land based on its exchange value, which
is the opposite of its use value (Vogel 1997).
In Logan and Molotch’s theory, a clash of interests happens between the progrowth coalition and antigrowth coalition. The strongest
driver behind the growth of an urban area is the progrowth coalition
that is formed by land-based elites, who comprise politicians and business groups. These entities have control over material and intellectual
resources to increase the value of land ownership (Parker 2004). Conhttps://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/politik/vol6/iss1/4
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versely, the antigrowth coalition believes that development initiatives
do not always bring benefits but, rather, negative impacts, such as the
marginalization of independent economic management and environmental degradation. To them, these impacts are the manifestation of
elite interests (Molotch 1976).
This theory is founded on several explicit key concepts (Rodgers
2009). The first concept pertains to exchange value, use value, and
space. This concept regards space as a commodity not only as the basis of collective livelihood or a result of social activities but also as
means to acquire wealth. The second concept is the land-based elites
or place entrepreneurs, who are elites involved in the commodification
of land exchange and lease. Land-based elites are those who acquire
the ownership of land through inheritance or feudalism and purchase
(Rodgers 2009). The third concept is the growth machine alliance,
or the coalition of elites, which comprises land-based elites who have
domination and influence over the orientation of urban development
initiatives. These elites have strong connections with local politicians,
media, and transportation agencies or companies. The fourth concept
is asset or mobile capital, which unites the interests of elites that fuel
the growth machine. The fifth concept is the promotion of growth as
a public good (Rodgers 2009).

Drivers of conf licts in the development
of inf rastr ucture projects
Based on research from Watkins et al. (2017) on conflicts in the development of infrastructure projects in Latin America and the Caribbean
over five decades, there are several categories of drivers of conflicts in
infrastructure projects: (1) environmental, (2) social, (3) governance, (4)
economic. These drivers are interrelated; the emergence of one driver
will stimulate the emergence of the others (Watkins et al. 2017). Two
main driver categories are relevant to this research: the governance and
social drivers. The governance driver emerges because of bad project
planning that comprises the setting of location and the development of
the area postconstruction, as well as minimum consultation between
Published by UI Scholars Hub, 2020
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the project executor and the people. The environmental driver in this
conflict is linked to several issues, such as the degradation of the ecosystem, pollution, deforestation, and climate change caused by the infrastructure project (Watkins et al. 2017).
The economic driver is related to several aspects. First, the inability of the government to complete the project in accordance with its
initial planning. Second, the unfair distribution of benefits that drew
complaints on the centralization of benefits to only urban areas by the
local communities. Third, the overpriced services and benefits of the
infrastructure. The local community and stakeholders often agree that
the costs of projects are too high, which result in the high price of services they provide. Fourth, conflicts that involve demands to increase
the wage of workers (Watkins et al. 2017).
The social driver pertains to the societal perception that certain
projects only bring unsatisfactory benefits or compensation, or harm
to the local community and stakeholders. Several examples of these
issues are the deprivation of access to farming and water resources that
make up the independent economic management or the community’s
livelihood, as well as a low number of job vacancies. The impact on
the society’s traditional values often also plays a part in the emergence
of resistance from the impacted communities (Watkins et al. 2017).
R ESE A RCH M E T HOD

In this research, the author employs a qualitative method, a social research approach that aims to analyze a social phenomenon holistically
and comprehensively. According to Creswell (2003), qualitative research
is a method that analyzes the condition of an object or phenomenon,
in which the researcher is the key instrument. Thus, the research is
conducted in an interactive manner and involves the exchange of social
experiences as perceived by the involved individuals. The data collection techniques that the author employs in this research are literature reviews, observation, in-depth interview, and documentation. In analyzing
the present case, the author uses a neo-marxist approach, which regards
economic factors, including production and transaction/exchange, as
https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/politik/vol6/iss1/4
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the triggers to social changes in capitalistic societies. These changes
usually occur through conflictual interclass interactions. These interactions are integral to the domination and exploitation expressed by
the radical egalitarianism employed by a normative Marxist agenda
(Wright 2005).
DISCUSSION

Context of agrarian politics in
Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta
Although the status of Kasultanan Yogyakarta was changed to DIY on
March 3, 1950, after the country’s independence, the laws of the land
in the region are still based on the monarchical concept that regards
the sultan as the dominant ruler. This provision is part of Law No.
3/1950, Article 4 Clause 1 Point 3 that stipulates the autonomy of DIY,
including its agrarian and land matters. In relation to this provision, the
government of DIY established Perda (Regional Regulation) No. 5/1954
on Land Rights outside Kota Praja, while lands inside the borders of
Kota Praja are still governed by old regulations from the Dutch colonial
era (Dewa 2017).
The Kasultanan land is divided into two parts: SG, which comprises
Kota Yogyakarta, Sleman, Bantul, Gunung Kidul, and the mountainous area of Kulon Progo; and PAG, which comprises the southern coast
of Kabupaten Kulon Progo. SG includes the crown Domain, which
consists of inheritable governmental attributes, such as the palace, the
city square, kepatihan, pasar ngasem, guest houses, the Gunung Kidul
Forest, and the Grand Mosque as well as the Sutanaad Ground, along
with the rights given to the people (Putra 2015). Usually, the land use of
SG is accompanied by Surat kekancingan from the Panitikismo. PAG is
the land ruled by Kadipaten Pakualaman and cultivated by its people or
the Kadipaten itself. The village authorities are given rights to use and
develop tanah Kas Desa, both from the Kadipaten and the Kasultanan,
as their pay (Hasim 2016).
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On September 24, 1960, the government passed Law No. 5 on Basic Agrarian Law (UUPA) to unify the national laws on agrarian land.
However, before 1984, the enactment of the UUPA did not apply to
the entirety of DIY. The fourth dictum of the UUPA stipulates that
the rights and authority over land and water in the area and ex-area of
swapraja (self-government) are given to the state since the enactment
of the UUPA and would be further regulated through PP (Government
Regulations-Peraturan Pemerintah). To fill in the gap in the law caused
by the yet-to-be-formulated PP, the government of DIY enacted Special
Regional Regulation or Perda Istimewa (Perdais) No. 5/1954 and Perda
No. 10/1964 (Dewa 2017).
In 1973, Sultan HB IX sent a request to the minister of home affairs, who held the authority to oversee national agrarian matters at the
time, to treat DIY equally to other regions in regard to agrarian matters. The request was granted through the formulation of Presidential
Decree (Keppres) No. 3/1984, which stipulates the UUPA 1960 to be
fully enacted in DIY and regulated by the Ministry of Home Affairs
(Mardaningrum 2010). The enactment of the Keppres meant that the
country’s agrarian laws were to apply nationally, including the swapraja
(self-government) regions of DIY.
The government of DIY then established Perda No. 3/1984 as a
follow-up legal mechanism to the Keppres. The third article of the Perda
states several old provisions on the autonomy of DIY swapraja (selfgoverning) regions pertaining to their land. These provisions originated
from the era of Dutch colonialism. The provisions were Rijksblaad
Kasultanan No. 16 and 18 Tahun 1989, Rijksblaad Kasultanan No. 11
Tahun 1928 jo. 1931 No. 2 and Rijskblaad Paku Alaman No. 13 Tahun
1928 jo. No. 1 / 1931, Rijskblaad Kasultanan No. 23 Tahun 1925, and
Rijskblad Paku Alaman No. 25 Tahun 1925 (Kusumoharyono 2006;
Antoro 2013). However, according to the Ministry of Home Affairs,
through the passing of Ministerial Decree of Home Affairs (Keputusan
Menteri Dalam Negeri) No. 66/1984, the full enactment of the UUPA
1960 in DIY was to be implemented gradually (Huda 2000).

https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/politik/vol6/iss1/4
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The enactment of the UUPA in DIY did not result in the unifying
of agrarian laws in the period after 1984. After the central government
established Law No. 13/2012 on Yogyakarta’s Special Status (UndangUndang Keistimewaan Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta- UUK), the government of DIY formulated Perdais Yogyakarta No. 1/2013 (Yogyakarta
Special Law), which fundamentally legitimizes a feudal dominant
system over swapraja land by the Kasultanan and Kadipaten. The Kasultanan and Kadipaten were then given status as legal entities (Sari,
Silviana, and Prasetyo 2016). The formulation of UUK began on May
10, 2012, when Sri Sultan HB X announced Sabdatama as the highest law in DIY, parallel to the constitution. These types of laws were
rarely made by the previous sultans unless it was deemed necessary to
overcome severe social conditions in DIY, such as what Sri Sultan HB
IX did to resolve turmoil just after the country’s independence.
Shortly after, the UUK No. 13/2012 was established on August
31, 2012. The formulation of the UUK draft began in 2000 and was
proposed to the central government to be discussed by the House of
Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat) in 2002. However, because
DIY was not a province with issues linked to separatism, the UUK
draft did not receive positive feedback from the central government
(Bhakti 2010). It was only in 2010, during President Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono’s term, that the UUK draft was reproposed to the central
government. The reproposal was not without its pros and cons, as the
president initially expressed his hesitance to recognize the “sovereignty”
of DIY (Wahyu 2018).
In comparison to other swapraja (self-governing) areas, Kasultanan
and Pakualaman Yogyakarta were able to take advantage of political opportunities in every rotation of political power in Indonesia. Both took
part in national movements and held important positions in the formal
political sphere, so they were able to maintain their influence at the
national and local levels (Antoro 2015). One of those roles is Sri Sultan
HB IX’s willingness to provide protection to several of the country’s
political leaders and lend his land as the country’s emergency capital
city during the country’s fight for independence (Bhakti 2010). These
Published by UI Scholars Hub, 2020
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political contributions gave DIY a relatively strong influence over the
central government’s decision to maintain its special status.
The elitist character of the effort to maintain DIY’s traditional political rule was demonstrated during the sultanate’s fight for the UUK.
The circulation of the draft among officials was minimal and often only
involved local officials, such as the heads of villages (Pranoto 2017).
The institutionalization of UU Keistimewaan was also supported by
several arguments (Antoro 2017). The first argument pertained to history, stating that the palace—which consists of the Kasultanan and
Pakualaman—was a sovereign political entity before Indonesia gained
its independence. The second argument was that the special status of
the Kasultanan and Pakualaman’s rights and authority was not regulated
by Indonesian law, which indicated a vacuum of power especially in
regard to the matters of land. Third was the political argument that the
revitalization of the UUPA is needed to accommodate swapraja (selfgovernment) land rights (Antoro 2017).
To exercise its special status and rights, the DIY provincial government receives annual funding from the national budget (APBN), which
increases each year. In contrast to Otsus (special autonomy), this funding does not have a time limit and will be continuously granted as long
as the region’s special status is recognized by the central government.
Regarding land governance, special funds were also allocated to the
certification of the palace’s estate, as stated in Rijksblad Kasultanan
Yogyakarta No. 16 Tahun 1918 and Rijksblad Pakualaman No. 18 Tahun
1918. In its execution, matters pertaining to the sultanate’s lands are
often difficult as the Kasultanan and Pakualaman, as legal entities, are
untouched by the audit on wealth and obligation of taxation (Idhom
2017).
Essentially, the agrarian political context in DIY today is not the
fault of its governance, but rather of the design of the country’s development layout from the colonial era until today (Pranoto 2017).
The region’s agrarian political context is shaped by the convergence of
the statist land rule system and neocustomary system, where the state
also indirectly rules the region by strengthening the traditional elites
https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/politik/vol6/iss1/4
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through the granting of autonomy (Pranoto 2017). This indirect rule
by the state complements the state’s position as the sole authority over
lands recognized by the constitution and the state’s legal provisions.
In its course of development, the state can control village residents
through eviction (Pranoto 2017). This condition is made possible
through the country’s acceptance of various laws during the colonial
era, where the plurality of legal frameworks was taken as part of the
Indonesian society’s authenticity. The people, especially those in rural
areas, are usually not aware that the plurality of legal frameworks tends
to benefit the elites (Pranoto 2017).
Studies in the field of political economy have demonstrated that the
political authorities of the palace elites in UU Keistimewaan facilitate
the Kasultanan and Kadipaten’s domination in various sectors, including control over land, decision-making pertaining to spatial governance
and function, circulation of investment, and control over institutions
and local governance (Subektie 2018). This domination of land ownership is often brought up in debates on the resilience of the monarchy
and oligarchy in the country’s democracy. UU Keistimewaan provides
legal justification for the government of DIY in the making of several
policies, such as the certification of land in SG and PAG, transfers of
land title to the palace, and temporary termination of extensions of
usage rights and building rights for state-owned lands (Gerakan Masyarakat Penerus Amanat Sultan HB IX 2015).
Land certification processes are usually accompanied by the acquisition and seizure of land by the Kadipaten Pakualaman and Kasultanan
DIY elites. Sri Sultan HB X has repeatedly emphasized the legalization
of SG and PAG through UU Keistimewaan (Aditjondro 2011). A number
of regulations have also been enacted to legitimize SG and PAG, such
as DIY Gubernatorial Regulation No. 112/2014 on the Utilization of
Village Land, Perdais No. 2/2017 on the Spatial Planning of Kasultanan’s and Kadipaten’s Land, and Perdais No. 1/2017 on the Management
and Utilization of Kasultanan’s and Kadipaten’s Land (Subektie 2018).
The UUK was often claimed to preserve the legal contradiction
between the colonial land laws, Rijksblad Kasultanan Yogyakarta No.
Published by UI Scholars Hub, 2020
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16 Tahun 1918 and Rijksblad Pakualaman No. 18 Tahun 1918, and the
UUPA 1960. The claim is based on the returning of lands previously
owned by the people as stipulated in the UUPA 1960 to the ownership of the Kasultanan (SG) and Kadipaten Pakualaman (PAG) (Goldie
2018). After their eviction, the people only have rights to the lease
or use of the land, usually known as magersari. The palace may take
away the land whenever it wishes. This condition will create unfair and
undemocratic political-economic relations, as well as decrease people’s
access to land (Idhom 2017).
These socioeconomic realities indicate that the political economy of
the UUK along with its legal derivatives are a manifestation of the Kasultanan and Pakualaman’s efforts to reorganize the colonial character
of swapraja by securing their positions as governors from generation to
generation (Antoro 2016). The consequences of these practices are often
ignored due to the many justifications made to dismiss them. One of
those justifications is that the swapraja is no different from customary
communities that are subject to customary laws. Kasultanan and Kadipaten Pakualaman perceive SG and PAS as tanah ulayat, or customary
land, excluding them from the jurisdiction of the UUPA. These claims
have received challenges from academic studies that showed the differences between customary laws and swapraja (Antoro 2015).
One of the harmful political-economic implications of this politicaleconomic reality for people is the liberalization of land utilization that
involves landlords and investors through Surat kekancingan. Panitikismo,
the institution that manages the land matters of the palace, can issue
Surat kekancingan to accommodate the interests of investors regarding
SG land (Suroatmojo 2017). The BPN (Badan Pertanahan Nasional/
National Land Agency) of DIY has issued building rights that strengthen the Pakualaman’s ownership claim and legitimized the Kadipaten’s
authority to transfer financial compensation through consignation to
village residents whose lands were confiscated.
Data from 2014 demonstrates that the most extensive areas of SG
and PAG are located in Kabupaten Kulon Progo, and these areas cover
26,451,247 ha, or 52.24% of total SG and PAG lands (Hasim 2016). Curhttps://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/politik/vol6/iss1/4
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rently, the areas of PAG are more dominant (Aditjondro 2011). These
areas will expand along with the inventory and certification of SG and
PAG in reference to the original of 1838 and the national budget. Since
the enactment of MP3EI in 2011, DIY has become the destination of
increasing capital and investment. In 2010, the investment amounted
to IDR4.3 trillion; the number increased to IDR7.75 trillion in 2012
(Yogyakarta 2016). This development shows how the DIY’s special status, under the guise of regional autonomy in the UUK, was not a matter of governance and administration, but rather the reorganization of
oligarchic power and the Kasultanan Yogyakarta elite domination over
agrarian rule. This premise is emboldened by the fact that the royal
family’s business networks have control over a large number of companies from various sectors and influence over the appointment of royal
family members in DIY’s social, economic, and political institutions
(Aditjondro 2011).
The power of the Kasultanan and Pakualaman’s claim over SG and
PAG was shown at the national conciliation FGD forum held by the
National Commission on Human Rights of Indonesia (Komnas HAM)
in November 11–14, 2015, which invited academicians and the governor
of DIY. When asked about the conflicts occurring on SG and PAG
lands, the governor of DIY—represented by the head of Panitikismo
KGPH Hadiwinoto—stated that the residents involved in the conflict
did not have any rights over the lands. He accused the residents of purposefully building and developing property unlawfully to claim rights
to compensation (Afandi 2016; Riyadi 2016). The political-economic
interests of the elites were also apparent as the two types of land became
a source of income through shares of Hotel Ambarukmo, Ambarukmo
Plaza, Saphier Square, and Padang Golf Merapi (Aditjondro 2011).
The enactment of the UUK has fostered many agrarian conflicts
in DIY, including the NYIA construction dispute. LBH Yogyakarta
reported that in 2015, there was a rising trend in human rights violations pertaining to the right to work and proper living. This trend was
attributed to UUK DIY. This fact is in line with the FKMA’s record
that shows that since the enactment of UU Keistimewaan, the numPublished by UI Scholars Hub, 2020
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ber of agrarian conflicts in DIY has significantly increased along with
the emergence of activism to oppose the domination of SG and PAG
ownership.

Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta in the
vortex of agrarian conf licts
Based on data from BPS, the poverty rate in DIY is above the national
average, while inequality in DIY reached 0.43% in March 2017. The
percentage was higher than the national inequality rate, which was
0.39%, and placed DIY at the second rank after Papua (Himawan 2017).
One of the factors behind this poor economic condition was the domination and management of land as means of production and control
over its utilization, which often results in vertical agrarian conflicts
(Subektie 2018). After the reform era, there were around 24 agrarian
conflicts in DIY.

Conf lict over the Constr uction of the N YIA Megaproject
in Temon District, Kulon Progo Regency in 2012–2018
In Organization Conflict: Concept and Models, Louis R. Pondy discusses conflicts in terms of five stages. The first stage is the latent conflict
stage (condition), which is marked by the emergence of conflict drivers.
Second is the perceived conflict stage where a party or actor perceives
the other as a threat. Third is the felt conflict stage, where a party fully
realizes the imbalance of power or position between them and the other
parties. Fourth is the manifest conflict stage, where two parties engage
in open confrontation, such as demonstrations, sabotage, and boycott.
Fifth is the conflict aftermath stage, which consists of two possibilities:
(a) the formulation of conflict resolution to accommodate the parties
involved or (b) the escalation of conflict (Pondy 1967).
In the context of the NYIA megaproject conflict, the latent conflict
stage began with the signing of a memorandum of understanding between PT Angkasa Pura I (AP I) and the Indian investment company
GVK Power and Infrastructure on January 25, 2011. The construction
https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/politik/vol6/iss1/4
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project was designed through a public–private partnership that involved
foreign investors, without support from the national budget during its
construction phase (Suharjono 2017). On May 11, the government of
DIY, represented by Sri Sultan HB X, signed an memorandum of understanding with PT AP I, represented by Tommy Soetomo, director
of Gedung Pracimosono, Kepatihan Complex. On May 13, the coast of
Temon District, Kulon Progo was set as the destination for the translocation of Bandara Adisucipto, which has an area of 637 ha and covers
six villages. The felt conflict stage was marked by the formation of the
WTT (Wahana Tri Tunggal) as an organization of collective opposition to the site’s construction on September 9, 2012. The organization
comprises the residents as well as farmers impacted by the construction.
The number of the organization’s members was estimated at 11,501
residents from 2,875 family units and six villages impacted.

The Dynamics of Vertical Conf lict: Physical
Violence, Intimidation, Human Rights
Violations, and Criminalization
The manifest conflict stage of the NYIA megaproject conflict was dynamic and accompanied by other events that contributed to the escalation of conflict. The conflict at this stage did not occur immediately, as it was preceded by several triggers that may be categorized
as latent conflicts. The WTT consolidated itself with other grass-roots
organizations, such as the PPLP (Paguyuban Petani Lahan Pantai), a
grass-roots organization whose main agenda is to oppose the mining
of iron sand and the building of steel mills. Each year, the number of
WTT members has declined. In November 2016, the WTT had 300
family units as its members, but before 2016, the organization had 600
(Reza 2016). The decline in these numbers can be attributed to the approaches employed by PT AP I and village officials. On April 16, 2017,
the WTT formed the Paguyuban Warga Penolak Penggusuran Kulon
Progo (PWPP-KP) in Glagah Village as a response to the declining
number of their members. The formation of the PWPP-KP involved an
estimated 300 people from eighty-six family units (Rimbawana 2017).
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The formation of the PWPP-KP indicated the conflict’s shift to
the conflict aftermath stage. This stage occurred when the structural
violence employed by the authorities was not sufficient to smooth the
agenda of land clearing, which began on November 27, 2017. The
land clearing started after President Joko Widodo issued Presidential
Regulation No. 98/2017 on Acceleration of Airport Development and
Operation in Kulon Progo on October 23, 2017. Opposition came from
university students, workers, farmers from various regions in the country
and (tergabung) Forum Sekolah Bersama (Sekber), Forum Komunikasi
Masyarakat Agraris, GESTOP BYIA, and other NGOs (Forum Komunikasi Masyarkat Agraria (FKMA) 2018). To ease the eviction process,
PT AP I along with PT PLN cut the electricity supply in the area
on November 27–29, 2017. The eviction was accompanied by physical
violence, intimidation, criminalization, and the detention of volunteers
and activists by PT AT, PT PP, and PT SKS. The authorities involved
included 400 municipal police personnel, police, the military, and civil
officers. The authorities employed repressive measures, such as breaking
down doors, demolishing places of worship, and barring residents from
entering their homes (Putsanra 2017).
During the land clearing on December 5, 2017, an artist who was
part of the Aliansi Warga Tolak Bandara, Hermanto, was injured because of being dragged by the authorities and hit by stones when he
attempted to prevent his art studio from being demolished by an excavator. Hermanto said that he never signed any land sale agreements and or
consignation (Edi 2017). Fajar, Hermanto’s brother, was strangled and
dragged by the authorities as well, when he tried to protect his backyard.
In addition to the destruction of property and homes, the December
5 eviction also involved the arrest of twelve activists on the charge of
provocation (Ratnasari 2017).

The horizontal conf lict bet ween residents
Besides the internal conflict within the WTT, the formation of Ge
mas NYIA, MPK, and FRWT (Forum Rembug Warga Transparansi)
as competing grass-roots organizations that support the construction
https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/politik/vol6/iss1/4
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of the NYIA also became a source of horizontal conflict between the
residents who were impacted. According to the WTT, two organizations
were formed by the government of Kulon Progo on April 14, 2014, to
generate support for the construction of the NYIA. Days after their
formation, these groups made banners expressing their support for the
project. This bipolarization of stances eroded the social cohesion and
solidarity of the local community. An example of horizontal conflict is
the ripping and confiscation of banners showing support for the NYIA
construction on April 30, 2014 (Subandar 2014).
Residents who had previously lived and worked together harmoniously, through their farming activities, grew hostile toward each other
because of these different perspectives. One of those impacted is Kelik
Martono, who has cut off all communication with members of his
family who support the construction (Ibrahim 2017). The residents in
support of the construction of the NYIA demanded the speeding up of
the project as they perceived the project to be in accordance with the
laws (Interview with Sri Mulyanto, December 20, 2018). They viewed
the activists, especially university students and the campus press, as
provocateurs behind the opposition to the construction.
DR I V ER S OF T H E N Y I A M EGA PROJ EC T CON F L IC T

Elitist decision-making
In the eyes of the central government, the construction of the NYIA
was a manifestation of their ambition to build an aerotropolis—a city
that has its spatial layout, economic sector, and infrastructure centred
around the airport. Aerotropolises are built to drive the growth of the
economy through the construction of complementary sites or zones,
such as shopping areas, culinary sites, hotels, business districts, cultural
sites, and tourism destinations. The existence of an airport also drives
the development of other infrastructure, such as highways and railroads.
The downside of this concept is that local small and medium enterprises will become marginalized, as the flow of profit will be exclusive
to transnational companies (Rose 2015).
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Politically, the NYIA was designed through an MP3EI policy
scheme during the administration of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (Ahmad 2018). The scheme designs systems of connectivity and economic
zonation of each region; through this scheme, Yogyakarta was designed
to be a region built on the meeting, incentive, convention, and exhibition (MICE) concept. Fundamentally, the MP3EI was based on an
Asian free-market framework, the Comprehensive Asian Development
Bank (CADP). The framework was formulated by the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN, an Asian economic think-tank, in 2010.
The combination of the pressure to overcome the 2008 economic crisis
and the ambition for economic growth in Asia became the justification
behind the formulation of the CADP. This scheme has a high chance
of shifting the function of infrastructure from being the provider of
public service for the people to an area of business serving industrial
interests (Rachman 2014).
The MP3EI was then adopted in the formulation of the National
Medium-Term Development Plan (Rancangan Pembangunan Jangka
Menengah Nasional) for 2015–2019, under the Joko Widodo administration. The framework sets Yogyakarta as an area of service and tourism.
However, the NYIA project was not part of the RPJMN, as cited in the
Deputy for Facilities and Infrastructure of Bappenas’s document presented in Ambon in December 2014. The Ministry of Tourism’s financial report in 2016 showed an increase in foreign tourist arrivals—12.1
million arrivals—or 100.2% from the initial target and 15.54% more
than that of the previous year. Amid the decreasing revenue from the
coal, palm oil, and oil and gas trades, these foreign tourist arrivals were
able to contribute IDR176–184 trillion to the country from its initial
target of 172 trillion. As a response to this achievement, the Ministry
of Tourism targeted to attract 17 million foreign tourists to the country
in 2018, higher than the previous year’s target, which was set at 10.46
million (Kementerian Pariwisata 2017).
To meet that target, in May 2016, Minister of Tourism Arief Yahya allocated a budget of USD755.5 million to tourism infrastructure,
which included eleven priority destinations equivalent to Dewata Island.
https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/politik/vol6/iss1/4
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Those eleven priority destinations were then narrowed down to three in
November 2016: Lake Toba, Mandalika, and Borobudur (Bridger 2017).
Similar to the central government, the government of DIY and the
government of Kulon Progo Regency’s policy orientation is influenced
by economic considerations, especially the tourism sector. To them,
the NYIA is deemed necessary to replace Adisucipto Airport, which
has limited capacity and is impossible to expand further. Since 2013,
there has been a surge in the number of passengers, which reached 2
million, while the area of Adisucipto Airport’s terminal is 15,000 square
meters and is built to accommodate only 1.2 million passengers per
year (Putera 2018).
Air traffic has also increased each year; in 2016, the number reached
53,752 and in 2017, the number was 57,677, with an average increase
rate of 7.30% (Sikumbang 2018). According to Agus Pandu Purnama,
PT AP I general manager for Adisucipto Airport, this situation limits
the movement of passengers in the airport. This infrastructural capacity limitation is predicted to result in a low occupancy rate of hotels in
Yogyakarta, which only reached 50 % despite the many foreign airlines
that take direct flight routes to Yogyakarta (Sikumbang 2018).
The government of DIY’s support for the development of the urban area is reflected in the opening of investment opportunities in the
rapidly growing property and hospitality sector. Data shows that the
increase in the number of hotels in Yogyakarta has a significant positive correlation with the increase in tourist arrivals. Data from Dinas
Pariwisata Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta shows a 263% surge in the region’s number of hotels and 283% in the number of tourist arrivals, both
foreign and domestic, over the course of five years (Dinas Pariwisata
2017). The increase in the number of hotels resulted in competition
within the hospitality industry.
To prevent market saturation, as an interest group in the hospitality
industry, PHRI recommended government direct investment in Kabupaten Gunungkidul, Bantul, and Kulon Progo. Out of the three regions,
Kabupaten Kulon Progo became a priority destination. The main consideration behind this decision was the NYIA megaproject (Linangkung
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2017). Thus, it was inevitable that the property and hospitality sector
became the most popular target of investment in Kabupaten Kulonprogo (DPMPT Kulon Progo 2019).
Based on a study conducted by Tim Persiapan Pembangunan Bandara Baru (P2B2), one of the reasons behind the opposition to the construction of the NYIA was ambiguity and a lack of consensus regarding
the compensation for the residents’ lands (Rizqiyah 2017). The mechanism of compensation through consignation was deemed harmful and
unaccommodating to the residents who opposed the construction of
the NYIA. The residents who objected to the construction of the NYIA
perceived the compensation as a form of unfair and biased transaction. According to Presidential Regulation No. 71/2012, consignation
is a mechanism of compensation for parties who agree to relinquish
the rights to their land. Therefore, negotiation and consensus should
emphasize compensation instead of whether the lands in question are
to be sold (Saluang 2018). The negotiations that emphasized the latter led the residents who opposed the construction also to oppose the
procedure of consignation.
This condition opened up room for other problems, such as negative “improvisation” by officials to meet the construction target. The
pressure from the central government to speed up the construction
prompted officials to use repressive means to clear the lands, such as
terror, force, and intimidation. The use of such measures was accompanied by framing of residents who refused to sell their lands, where
they were framed as though they were protesting their compensation
(Saluang 2018). According to the PWPP-KP, the government of Kulon
Progo, the vice head of the Wates Court and PT AP I acted as though
the process of consignation was still ongoing despite the procedure being under investigation by Ombudsman DIY due to an indication of
maladministration (PWPP-KP 2018).
Acts of intimidation and terror in the name of consignation during
the process of land clearing were carried out starting on November
27, 2017. Police officials took down the electric meters of the houses
of residents who refused to give up their land. The residents repeathttps://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/politik/vol6/iss1/4
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edly demanded warrants and letters of assignment for the land clearing but were ignored by the authorities. Furthermore, the authorities
destroyed the houses of residents who had not received compensation
before those who had. On December 4, a clash took place between the
residents and officials, as well as the arrest of twelve students who were
accused of provocation (Savitri et al. 2018). An investigation conducted
by Ombudsman DIY discovered that the police were involved in the
land clearing, the destruction of building and electric meters, and the
cutting of the electricity supply. The investigation suggested that there
was a conduct of maladministration as the police seemed to assume
the role and position of PT AP I rather than as officers whose main
responsibility is to maintain the protection and safety of the people
(Pertana 2017).
The PWPP-KP’s course to reject the consignation system was supported by LBH Yogyakarta as the mechanism aimed to confiscate property unilaterally without the consent of the people. The law stipulates
that the system of compensation can be conducted through consignation under the condition that (1) the landowner rejects the compensation or decision made by the court, or (2) the land in question is a
matter of a legal problem or dispute. The consequence of the mechanism was that the parties who consistently rejected the land clearing
were deemed “to have lost the battle” as the mechanism involved the
estimation of the value of the property and forced the residents to give
up their rights over their lands (Resnanto 2017).
Ideally, consignation is conducted when the whereabouts of the
party involved is unknown or when the ownership of the land is an
object of legal dispute. These conditions were not met in the case of
the NYIA conflict (Aziz 2017). Furthermore, Law No. 2/2012 Article
36 Clause 3 stipulates that the compensation should be agreed upon by
both parties. In reality, this mechanism of consignation created a “new
alternative” for residents who rejected the construction of the NYIA,
where they were forced to request a “re-estimation” of the value of their
land when their opposition to the land clearing was deemed unlawful.
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Kadipaten Pakualaman, as deputy to the governor of DIY, dominated the ownership of the land impacted by the construction: an area
of 160 ha, or 27% of the total land needed for the site’s construction
(Permana 2017). The legality of the ownership is based on UU Keistimewaan DIY, which contained provisions from Rijskblad Pakualaman
Tahun 1918, that was enacted during the Dutch colonial era. To the residents who opposed the NYIA construction, as well as the intellectual
groups and NGOs supporting them, the law was abolished when the
UUPA was fully enacted in DIY, although the residents who managed
and cultivated the lands in PAG—through the building and creation of
property, fish farms, or agriculture—did not possess land titles (Goldie
2018).
Residents who joined PKPLP, a group consisting of farmers and
cultivators in PAG, had to release their land with a compensation that
was miniscule compared to the profit that Pakualaman obtained, which
reached IDR702 billion from the total of IDR727 billion. The PKPLP
demanded compensation of one-third to one-half of the total profit
received by Pakualaman. Pakualaman rejected the request and chose
to provide compensation in the form of the tali asih program, or expression of gratitude. The FKPLP felt that they played a significant role in
the cultivation of Pakualaman land, which contributed to the region’s
agrarian productivity. The FKPLP finally received financial compensation of IDR25 billion through the Pakualaman’s instruction to Regent
of Kulon Progo, Hasto Wardoyo in late October 2017 (Jati 2017).

Gover nance driver of conf lict: Lack of dialogue and
consultation bet ween the communit y and P T A P I
This problem was reflected in the process of consignation, where the
lands of the residents who opposed the construction were entrusted to
the Wates Court. AS a result, the residents lost their normative rights to
their land despite their possession of certificates, girik, or other proof of
ownership. The residents also refused to fulfill consignation summonses
from the court, claiming that they never submitted proof of ownership
to the court and that there was an absence of land valuation. The resihttps://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/politik/vol6/iss1/4
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dents also did not attend public consultations or negotiations pertaining
to land transactions with PT AP I (Aziz 2017). This issue underlay the
demonstration opposing the consignation that took place in the court’s
yard on March 2, 2017 (Widiyanto 2017).
Initially, the WTT refused to attend the public consultation regarding the construction of the NYIA. The head of the WTT said that
residents unconditionally refused to compromise. However, on September 23, 2014, the organization decided to attend the third public
consultation—those who did not come were even assumed to support
the construction. The WTT planned to attend the public consultation
with a formal invitation. However, security officers prevented their arrival without explanation (Putri and Astarina 2015). The secretary of
PT AP I claimed that the measure was taken in anticipation of the
WTT’s protests, which might result in other invitees not coming (Ibrahim 2017).When the IPL was issued, only 10% of residents (consisting of
civil servants, military, and police personnel) agreed to the construction,
while 60% refused (farmers) and the remaining others refused to state
their stance (Imelda 2017). Public consultations were conducted several
times, but the dialogues with the WTT were not conducive and participative. The consultation on March 3, 2015, did not Invite 50 WTT
members who owned land in the area. A similar situation happened
during the February 26, 2015, consultation and the November 10, 2016,
discussion on the assessment of environmental impacts (Amdal). The
consultations only involved residents who supported the construction,
who were also selected by their head of villages. The WTT said that
this measure was taken to ensure the formulation of an environmental
impact assessment (Amdal) that served the interests of the government
and PT AP I (Imelda 2017).

Social driver of conf lict: Perception of har ms
The P2B2 and PT AP I team said that the are several reasons underlay
the residents’ opposition to the construction of the NYIA (Rizqiyah
2017). First, the residents were reluctant to hand over their land to begin with. Second, the lands had been passed down from generation to
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generation. This argument was often used by the residents, despite their
being offered a large sum of money—up to billions—to compensate
them for their land. Third, the residents were content with their farming livelihoods. Fourth, uncertainty surrounded the residents’ business
enterprises. Fifth, for the members of WTT, the areas of land in question were their main means of production, which had contributed to
the development of the area’s agrarian economy through the residents’
labor and farm produce. To them, the construction of the NYIA would
reduce their productivity because of the decrease in land capability;
300 ha, or almost half of the construction site, is comprised of arable—
both wet and dry—land (Amin 2018).
It was estimated that around 148,000 farmers would lose their livelihoods that depended on the production of eggplant, squash, watermelons, melons, and chilis. From every hectare, the farmers were able
to harvest an average of 60 tons of squash, 180 tons of melons, 90
tons of watermelons, 90 tons of eggplant, and 30 tons of chilis (Niam
2017). Furthermore, the production of rice was also predicted to wane
to around 6 tons per ha each year because of the clearing of 100.37 ha
of rice fields (Evani 2018). The Perda No. 2/2010 Article 51 Point G
stipulates that the region of Kabupaten Kulon Progo is protected farming land, both its wet and dry lands. According to data from BPS,
Yogyakarta, Indonesia, Kabupaten Kulon Progo consisted of productive
farming land that made up one of the main providers of food in DIY
(Ahmad 2018). The construction of the NYIA was proven to result in
the rise in food insecurity in Kecamatan Temon, from 87 to 90% in
2018 (Nurpita, Wihastuti, and Andjani 2018).
The construction of the NYIA also threatened the region’s cultural
heritage. Those cultural heritage sites include Stupa Glagah, Arca Perunggu Amonghasidhi dan Vajrapani, Batu Bata Besar, Lumpang Batu,
Makam Mbah Drajat, Situs Petilasan Gunung Lanang and Gunung
Putri, and Batu Besar Eyang Gadhung Mlati. These sites are legally
protected in the DIY Gubernatorial Regulation No. 62/2013 on the
Preservation of Cultural Heritage (PWPP-KP 2018).

https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/politik/vol6/iss1/4
DOI: 10.7454/jp.v6i1.214

24

Fitriantoro: Drivers of Conflict in Urban Infrastructure: Case Study of the Ne
DRIVERS OF CONFLICT IN URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE

113

CONCLUSION

Based on the discussion above, the author concludes that the conflict
related to the construction of the NYIA megaproject was caused by at
least three main drivers: (a) elitist-based interests, (b) governance driver
of conflict, and (c) social driver of conflict. The premise for elite-based
interests is founded on two main arguments and field findings, which
are (a) the economic argument about the pressure for the growth of the
tourism industry, and (b) the political argument on the domination of
land ownership by elites in DIY and its preservation through Law No.
13/2012. At least two arguments explain the elitist policy-making in the
construction of the NYIA megaproject: the economic and the political
argument. The economic argument revolves around the convergence of
local and national elites’ interests shaped by pressure for the economic
growth of the tourism industry. The political argument explains how
the domination of land ownership by Kadipaten Pakualaman continued
to be legitimized through Presidential Regulation No. 71/2012 and Law
No. 2/2012, which legitimize the confiscating nature and unilateral
procedure of consignation.
Based on Molotch’s (1976) theory on elite-based interests in urban
development, the economic argument concerns the pressure for tourism
growth, both from the regional and the national government. The political argument is built on the domination of land ownership by palace
elites (Kadipaten Pakualaman and Kasultanan) that is legitimized by
UUK DIY and other special regional laws, as well as the arrangement
of unfair compensation through consignation. Another factor that contributed to the conflict is the lack of consultation between the residents
impacted by the construction and PT AP I as the executor of the project. Along with the minimum compensation given to the residents
impacted by the construction, these problems make up the governance
and social drivers of conflict.
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